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ARTICLE
WHEN INDIVIDUALS SEEK DEATH AT
THE HANDS OF THE POLICE: THE
LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF SUICIDE BY COP AND WHY
POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD USE
NONLETHAL FORCE IN DEALING
WITH SUICIDAL SUSPECTS
RAHI AZIZI*

INTRODUCTION
Occasionally, Joel Schumacher’s 1993 film Falling Down, starring
Michael Douglas and Robert Duvall, serves as a topic of discussion in
academic papers. 1 In Falling Down, Douglas plays Bill Foster, a
psychotic engineer fired from his position at a missile defense company.
A traffic jam on a scorching day in Los Angeles serves as the triggering
event in the storyline. Ostracized from work and delirious from heat,

*J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Many thanks to Bailey Bifoss and
the staff of the Golden Gate Law Review for all of their hard work on this piece.
1
See Rebecca Johnson & Ruth Buchanan, Getting the Insider’s Story Out: What Popular
Film Can Tell Us About Legal Method’s Dirty Secrets, 20 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 87, 100103 (2001) (discussing the film Falling Down as an example of the perceptual powers of cinema);
see also Christine Alice Corcos, “Who Ya Gonna C(s)ite?” Ghostbusters and the Environmental
Regulation Debate, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 231, 271 n.180 (1997) (discussing Falling Down as
an example of a movie with a frustrated protagonist who takes the law into his own hands).
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Foster leaves his car in the middle of the freeway and journeys by foot to
Venice Beach, where he hopes to reunite with his estranged wife and
daughter. En route, he engages in violent confrontations with several
individuals, including a Korean storeowner, three Mexican gang
members, and a militant skinhead.
Duvall’s character, a homicide detective, tracks Foster down and
corners him at a pier in Venice. Even though he discarded his gun earlier
that day, Foster suggests that they have a shoot out. He reaches into his
pocket and pretends to retrieve a weapon. The detective instinctively
shoots him. Before he falls over the pier, Foster pulls out a squirt gun he
had obtained earlier from his daughter’s room. The audience realizes
that Foster wanted to die. By goading the officer into killing him, Foster
enabled his wife to collect the proceeds of his life insurance policy and
raise their daughter securely.
Foster’s death constitutes a recognized category of police killings:
suicide by cop. 2 The term “suicide by cop” (alternatively, “policeassisted suicide” 3 ) is controversial and ill-defined. Academics have
explored the psychological and narratological implications of suicide by
cop to some extent. We know that suicidal individuals sometimes enlist
the help of others in killing themselves as a way to overcome the moral
prohibition against committing suicide. 4 And, as exemplified in Falling
Down, directors and writers sometimes use suicide by cop as a narrative
device in portraying the demise of a protagonist who is either a
sympathetic vigilante or an antihero. 5 However, our legal literature has
not thoroughly examined how classifying a police killing as suicide by
cop might shape legal complaints against law enforcement agencies. 6
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that police officers can use deadly
force against a suspect only if he or she employs deadly force against an
officer or a bystander. 7 The standard to determine whether an officer’s

2

Alan Feuer, Drawing a Bead on a Baffling Endgame: Suicide by Cop, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 1998, at 4.
3
See Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits:
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 556 (2000) (stating that the term
“suicide by cop” is interchangeable with “police assisted suicide”).
4
MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9 (2004).
5
For example, in S.E. Hinton’s coming-of-age novel about 1960s greasers, The Outsiders,
one of the main characters of the book commits suicide by cop. S.E. HINTON, THE OUTSIDERS
(1967).
6
The exception is Flynn and Homant’s work. See Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant,
“Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
555 (2000).
7
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
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use of force is excessive is one of “objective reasonableness”: whether it
was objectively reasonable under the circumstances for the officer to
believe that the suspect meant to kill or seriously harm others. 8 Evidence
that the suspect threatened to harm the officer or civilians is helpful in
making this determination. 9 Sometimes the police realize after the
shooting that despite his or her actions, the suspect did not intend to harm
anyone. 10 The suspect may have threatened to shoot a bystander to
facilitate the commission of a robbery or to escape the scene of a
nonviolent crime. Yet the suspect’s intent does not factor into a
determination of whether the officer’s use of lethal force was lawful. 11
As long as it was objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude—
precisely at the moment that he or she fired the shot—that the suspect
was about to use lethal force, the officer’s use of deadly force is
excusable. 12
This Article serves two purposes: 1) to determine whether suicide
by cop can form the basis for a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, part of
the 1871 Civil Rights Act 13  the main federal statute through which
private litigants can bring civil rights suits against police departments
and 2) to analyze the policy implications of recognizing suicide by cop as
a unique category of police killings. This Article will also determine
whether a suicide-by-cop killing inclines courts to apply something other
than the “objectively reasonable” standard in adjudicating a § 1983
claim. 14 Furthermore, it will try to determine whether evidence of the
8

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-98 (1989).
However, as this Article will further explore, the suspect’s intent to commit suicide does
not necessarily negate the reasonableness of the officer’s actions, given the difficult decisions
officers must make when confronting potentially dangerous suspects. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 39798 (stating that the calculus of reasonableness must “embody allowance for the fact that officers are
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation”).
10
See Wood v. City of Lakeland, 203 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other
grounds in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). In that case, a suicidal suspect cut himself with a
knife before the police arrived, indicating that he probably meant only to harm himself. Also,
evidence in that case suggested that he did not intentionally provoke the officers. Rather, he
inadvertently fell off the dresser drawer, whereupon the officers thought he was about to attack them
and so shot him to death.
11
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (holding that the “reasonableness” of an officer’s actions
must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight).
12
See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12 (holding that an officer must reasonably believe that a
suspect poses a deadly threat before he can deploy lethal force against the suspect).
13
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2011).
14
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388 (holding that the appropriate standard for deciding § 1983
suits is whether an objectively reasonable officer would have used that degree of force under the
circumstances).
9
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suspect’s suicidal intentions can either improve or mitigate the plaintiff’s
chances of prevailing in court. 15
Additionally, this Article makes two principal arguments. First,
because suicide by cop can often result in litigation, police departments
should train officers to better ascertain when a suspect may be attempting
suicide by cop. 16 While many courts bar the admission of “pre-seizure”
evidence (evidence that came into being before the suspect’s interaction
with officers, like a suicide note 17 ) in § 1983 suits, some courts have
shown a willingness to admit evidence that the suspect was attempting
suicide. 18 Therefore, police departments face a tangible threat of
litigation stemming from suicide-by-cop incidents. 19 At least one federal
appellate case, Palmquist v. Selvik, suggests that evidence of suicide by
cop may be pertinent in determining whether police tactics are
appropriate under § 1983. 20
Second, because suicide by cop poses a significant sociological
problem, 21 we should encourage police officers to employ nonlethal
force in defusing an attempt at suicide by cop where the risk of harm to
others is minimal. 22 Victims of suicide by cop often share certain traits:
they are usually poor, mentally ill, and addicted to alcohol or narcotics. 23
Law enforcement agencies must educate officers of the underlying
circumstances that can contribute to suicide by cop. 24 Suicide-by-cop
15

In Garner, the Supreme Court held that the trier of fact must determine whether an
officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable according to the totality of circumstances at the
time of the shooting. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9-10. The question this Article confronts is whether a
suspect’s suicidal motives or actions constitute a circumstance that the trier of fact may consider.
16
Many police departments provide some general training on suicide intervention. See
Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: Relevance of
Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 574 (2000).
17
See, e.g., Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that “pre-seizure
conduct is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny”).
18
See, e.g., Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1342 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that evidence
that a suspect intends to commit suicide by police is “directly relevant to his life expectancy” and
therefore likely admissible). This Article will closely examine the Palmquist opinion in later
sections.
19
Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits:
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 558 (2000).
20
Palmquist, 111 F.3d at 1340-42.
21
See Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller III, Suicide by Cop:
Defining a Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 19-20 (2005),
available
at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005pdfs/feb05leb.pdf (characterizing suicide-by-cop incidents as “painful and damaging experiences for
surviving families, the communities, and all law enforcement professionals”).
22
Id. at 11.
23
MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 87 (2004).
24
Flynn and Homant have pointed out that until fairly recently, very few police departments
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incidents may worsen police-community relations because residents
might think that the police shooting was unnecessary, unjustified, or even
racially motivated. 25 Therefore, police officers should minimize the
occurrences of suicide by cop by using deadly force only when
absolutely necessary.
I.

THE HISTORY AND PREVALENCE OF SUICIDE BY COP

A.

THE ORIGINS OF THE TERM “SUICIDE BY COP”

Forensic medical journals coined the term “suicide by cop.” 26 Prior
to the 1990s, the term was not widely known, but today law enforcement
agencies and media commentators frequently use it. 27 However, there is
no commonly accepted definition of suicide by cop, which considerably
complicates its consideration in § 1983 lawsuits. 28
Some consider the classification a misnomer. 29 One commentator
suggests that suicide by cop is “far more often a post hoc justification of
sloppy police work than a valid explanation of why and how someone
died.” 30 Another characterizes it as a “catchy descriptor for a far larger
number of cases in which officers put themselves unnecessarily into
harm’s way” and must “shoot their way out.” 31 From this perspective,
the classification tends to insulate police officers from blame even when
their actions were unreasonable. 32 The word “suicide” suggests that the

dealt specifically with “suicide-by-police” scenarios. Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant,
“Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
555, 574 (2000).
25
MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 99 (2004).
26
Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits:
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 556 (2000).
27
Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller, Suicide by Cop: Defining a
Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 10 (2005), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-pdfs/feb05leb.pdf.
28
Id.
29
See James J. Fyfe, Policing the Emotionally Disturbed, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L.
345, 346 (2000) (arguing that suicide by cop is an inadequate explanation of why and how someone
dies).
30
See id.
31
Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality of
Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed
People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 297 n.173 (2003) (internal citation omitted).
32
See Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality
of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed
People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 298 (2003) (suggesting that because plaintiffs in police
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suspect was to blame for his or her own death; the officer was merely an
unwitting instrument in effectuating the suspect’s suicidal desires. 33
According to proponents of this view, suicide by cop is nothing more
than an attempt to shift blame “from police to victim.” 34
Others have defined suicide by cop as a situation in which “a
suicidal, distraught and often unbalanced individual comes into contact
with law enforcement officers,” and through life-threatening actions
“causes the police to retaliate in self-defense or defense of others by
killing the person.” 35 The best example emerges when a suspect
deliberately points an unloaded gun at a police officer in order to
provoke a violent response. 36 The suspect’s intent becomes probative; if
the offender intends to kill the officer or threatens him or her with deadly
force in order to escape, labeling the incident as suicide by cop proves
misleading. 37 It erroneously portrays a potential murderer as a victim of
police brutality.
B.

THE PREVALENCE OF SUICIDE BY COP

Studies that explore the frequency of suicide by cop emerged in the
early 1990s, 38 after a California newspaper acknowledged that suicide by
cop was a growing problem among lower-income males in San Diego. 39
Unfortunately, complete, nationwide statistics on suicide by cop are
unavailable. 40 The Uniform Crime Reporting program indicates that
between 1991 and 2000, sixty-two offenders who feloniously killed a

misconduct cases often challenge the way in which officers were trained, police training on suicidal
suspects may be relevant to a plaintiff’s claim).
33
Mary Romero, State Violence, and the Social and Legal Construction of Latino
Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1081, 1103 n.134 (2001).
34
Id.
35
Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits:
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 555 (2000).
36
Some might characterize such a situation as suicide by cop even if the gun was loaded.
See, e.g., James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to Youth
Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 137 (2000). What ultimately matters with regard to the
classification is the suspect’s intent.
37
James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to Youth
Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 137 (2000).
38
Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits:
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 556 (2000).
39
Clark Brooks, Suicide by Cop; Officers Sometimes Find Themselves Pawns in an
Individual’s Death Wish, San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 26, 1991, at C1.
40
Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller, Suicide by Cop: Defining a
Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 9 (2005), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-pdfs/feb05leb.pdf.
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law enforcement officer committed suicide during the same incident. 41
The study fails, however, to identify the number of suspects who
intentionally goaded officers into shooting them during that time
period. 42
In compiling statistics, law enforcement and social service agencies
usually consider incidents in which suspects genuinely attempted to harm
or kill police officers. 43 Neglecting to consider these situations might be
unfair to police officers, as the use of lethal force against a suspect who
is attempting suicide is justified when the suspect poses a concomitant
danger to either the officer or public safety. 44 Moreover, a suspect who
intends to harm officers or others can still possess the requisite intent to
commit suicide by cop.
Merely identifying the number of individuals who commit suicide
by cop does not adequately address the problem. Rather, studies should
identify the characteristics that perpetrators share, so that police officers
can more readily determine whether a suspect exhibits those
characteristics. A study conducted by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department does precisely that. The study indicates that roughly 10% of
officer-involved shootings end in suicide by cop. 45 According to this
study, 65% of offenders who commit suicide by cop convey their
suicidal intent to others, 46 43% exhibit signs of suicidal behavior and
22% leave suicide notes. 47 An alarming 59% ask the police to kill them
and 15% continue to point a gun at the police after being warned that
they would be shot. 48 Finally, the study found that 16% of those who
commit suicide by cop were not armed with a gun, but were trying to
harm the officer with a knife. 49
For the most part, studies about suicide by cop are scarce and
41

Id. at 10; see also Alan Feuer, Drawing a Bead on a Baffling Endgame: Suicide by Cop,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1998, at 4.
42
Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller, Suicide by Cop: Defining a
Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 10 (2005), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-pdfs/feb05leb.pdf.
43
Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits:
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 556 (2000).
44
Id. at 570 n.116.
45
Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller, Suicide by Cop: Defining a
Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 10 (2005), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-pdfs/feb05leb.pdf.
The study was based on suicide-by-cop incidents that occurred during a ten-year period, from 1987
to 1997.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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inadequate. 50 The foregoing studies are limited because they do not
indicate whether a given suicidal suspect threatened officers with a
nonlethal instrument, nor do they indicate whether the officers were
aware that the suspect was suicidal. Without more comprehensive data
on suicide by cop, law enforcement agencies may not be able to assess
the ways in which suicide-by-cop incidents strain relations between
police departments and members of the communities they serve. 51
II.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOMICIDE AND SUICIDE: ASSESSING
THE SOCIOECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
SUICIDE BY COP

A.

THE LINK BETWEEN HOMICIDE AND SUICIDE

A relationship exists between self-destructive and homicidal
impulses. 52 For instance, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the teenage
perpetrators of the Columbine Massacre, killed themselves shortly after
murdering 18 classmates in their high school cafeteria on April 20,
1999. 53 Kip Kinkel, a 15-year-old who went on a shooting spree in
Springfield, Oregon, screamed “Kill me! Kill me!” after being wrestled
to the ground by onlookers. 54 Often, acts of self-destruction and the
destruction of others share similar psychological roots: the sense that life
is intolerable and that death is the only true escape. 55 Consequently,
homicide sometimes functions as a masked suicide attempt, especially
when the suspect is certain his or her actions will trigger a lethal police
response. 56 A suicidal suspect who threatens others with violence may
rather die than face incarceration. 57 Thus, the suspect will devise a
situation in which officers have little choice but to shoot him or her. 58

50

Id. at 74.
Id.
52
MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 13 (2004).
53
James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to Youth
Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 131 (2000).
54
Id. at 137.
55
Id.
56
Id. (stating that “in some cases, the act of killing others is intended as a suicide attempt”).
57
Id.
58
Id. (suggesting that the suspect may devise such a situation by “taking hostages or pointing
a loaded gun at a police officer”).
51
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FACTORS THAT TRIGGER SUICIDE BY COP

The factors that lead to suicide-by-cop are similar to the factors
behind other forms of suicide: poverty, unemployment, drug addiction,
depression, mental illness, and a history of familial dissension. 59 For
example, in one case a suicidal drug addict assailed a police officer
because he was dissatisfied with his job as a mechanic. 60 In another
case, a suspect who threatened police officers with physical violence
kept exclaiming that his life “isn’t worth anything” and insisted that the
officers shoot him. 61 Multiple factors like economic hardship coupled
with substance abuse can drive an individual to commit violent crimes. 62
A single factor by itself is less likely to trigger violence. 63 For instance,
one study revealed that the odds of a male teenager acting violently
doubled if he abused alcohol or drugs. 64 The odds tripled if the teenager
also had a prior arrest record. 65
Mental instability can also trigger confrontations with officers. 66 In
Wallace v. Davies, a suspect became suicidal after unsuccessfully trying
to contact his mental health counselor. 67 The police promptly arrived at
the suspect’s apartment and found the suspect in possession of a gun,
planning to shoot himself. 68 An officer, upon seeing the gun, fired once
at the suspect, fatally wounding him. 69
A similar case, Hainze v. Richards, demonstrates the difficulty that
police officers face when subduing suicidal suspects who exhibit signs of
mental illness, like delusions and auditory hallucinations. 70 In Hainze,
the police responded to a call from a woman to transport her suicidal
nephew to a hospital for mental health treatment. 71 The nephew had a
59

Id. at 137-38.
Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1335-36 (7th Cir. 1997).
61
Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1994).
62
James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to Youth
Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 138 (2000).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality
of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed
People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 262-63 (2003) (stating that nationwide, police
departments “estimate that an average of approximately seven percent of police calls involve
mentally ill people”).
67
Wallace v. Estate of Davies by Davies, 676 N.E.2d 422, 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
68
Id. at 424-25.
69
Id. at 424.
70
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 797-98 (5th Cir. 2000).
71
Id. at 798.
60
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mental illness and was under the influence of alcohol and
antidepressants. 72 The police had been notified he was contemplating
suicide by cop. 73 When officers arrived on the scene he walked toward
the officers with a knife. 74 After he refused an order to stop, the officers
shot him. 75 The suspect survived, but the court addressed the issue of
whether anything short of lethal force might have disabled the suspect
without compounding the risk of harm to the officers. 76 The Fifth
Circuit exonerated the officers after commenting on the danger posed to
public safety by the knife-wielding, intoxicated suspect. 77
C.

BETTER UNDERSTANDING WHY INDIVIDUALS COMMIT SUICIDE BY
COP AND WHY THE POLICE SHOULD USE NONLETHAL FORCE IN
THE FIRST PLACE

In order to enable officers to resolve suicide-by-cop incidents
through nonviolent methods, police departments must provide more
adequate training concerning the traits shared by suicide-by-cop victims.
The cases and limited studies we have reflect a general trend: the
majority of victims of suicide by cop are young and economically
disadvantaged males, often wrestling with psychosis or substance
abuse. 78 However, unlike other suicidal individuals (e.g., the Columbine
shooters), they require assistance in accomplishing their own deaths.
Someone else has to pull the trigger.
Some commentators argue that distinguishing the homicidal from
the suicidal does not advance a particular law enforcement aim. 79 The
systemic problems that trigger both suicide and homicide among urban
youth are almost identical in nature. 80 Like persons who are suicidal,
homicidal individuals are predominantly disadvantaged and have a
propensity toward substance abuse. 81 From this perspective, suicide by
cop is not really a “police problem” in that it does not substantially differ
from other forms of suicide. Accordingly, the term “suicide by cop” is

72

Id.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 798-99.
76
Id. at 798.
77
Id. at 800-02
78
MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 87 (2004).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 50.
81
Id. at 49-50.
73
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inconsequential. It should not have any bearing on police work. 82
Instead, these commentators argue that the responsibility should fall on
social service workers and mental health professionals to facilitate early
intervention before children are old enough to commit violent crimes.
The advocates of this view raise significant points. 83 A suspect who
genuinely desires to hurt civilians or police officers is not entitled to
preferential treatment from law enforcement agents simply because he or
she is suicidal. 84 However, victims of suicide by cop often do not pose a
threat of violence to others. They merely wish to end their lives. No
community can completely eradicate the factors that lead to suicide, such
as depression, poverty, and substance abuse. 85 Therefore, the burden
falls on law enforcement agencies to train officers to exercise greater
restraint when dealing with individuals who appear to be attempting
suicide by cop. Otherwise, police officers will continue to serve as
instruments through which desperate individuals can effectuate their
suicidal desires.
III. SUICIDE BY COP IN § 1983 LAWSUITS
A suspect’s recourse against a police officer who uses excessive
force is a § 1983 lawsuit. 86 Through a § 1983 lawsuit, the plaintiff—
either the suspect, or if the suspect is killed, his or her estate—can allege
that the officer’s use of excessive force constituted an unreasonable
“seizure” or arrest that violated his or her Fourth Amendment rights. 87
The standard for determining whether the officer’s use of force was
excessive is the “objective reasonableness” test, articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor. 88 In order to prevail under that
82

For example, at least one court has held that failing “merely to instruct police on the
handling of dangerous people who appear to be irrational cannot amount to deliberate indifference.”
Pena v. Leombruni, 200 F.3d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999). Pena’s holding suggests that even if a
suspect is suicidal or deranged, the police cannot be deemed negligent in their handling of the
suspect if he or she posed a danger to others.
83
Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits:
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 577 (2000) (stating that “holding
police responsible for having someone aim a shotgun at them because they checked a doorknob . . .
would at best be likely to have a chilling effect on policy intervention into any situation”).
84
Id.
85
See James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to
Youth Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 142 (2000) (discussing the socioeconomic issues
plaguing urban youth).
86
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2011).
87
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985), (holding that apprehension “by the use of
deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment”).
88
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-398 (1989).
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test, the plaintiff must show that the use of deadly force was not
reasonably necessary from the perspective of the objective police officer
under the apparent circumstances. 89
Tennessee v. Garner governs the propriety of a police officer’s use
of deadly force. 90 The use of deadly force is justified only if the suspect
poses an immediate threat of serious bodily harm to the officer or
civilians. 91 In determining whether the officer’s belief that the suspect
posed an immediate threat of serious harm was objectively reasonable,
courts will consider “the totality of the circumstances” at the time of the
shooting. 92 As this Article will show, the legal standard remains the
same where suicide by cop is in play. 93 But the question becomes
whether suicide by cop is an admissible circumstance that factors into a §
1983 analysis. In answering that question, it is necessary to examine the
legislative rationale behind § 1983.
A.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 1983: AN ATTEMPT TO REMEDY
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

The enactment of § 1983 was tied to the Civil War and
Reconstruction—the period following the assassination of President
Lincoln when Congress passed a series of laws designed to secure the
rights of citizenship for emancipated African-Americans. 94 Congress
borrowed much of the language in § 1983 from the Enforcement Act of
1871. 95 That statute, passed during the Reconstruction Period following
the Civil War, was designed to provide African-Americans with a federal
civil rights remedy against white supremacist organizations like the Ku
Klux Klan and the White Brotherhood. 96 Federal civil rights legislation
was necessary because local and state governments refused to protect
African-Americans from violent racists. 97 Moreover, local governments

89

See id. at 397 (holding that the inquiry “is an objective one: the question is whether the
officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation”).
90
Garner, 471 U.S. 1.
91
Id. at 11.
92
Id. at 9-10.
93
Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1337 (7th Cir. 1997).
94
For an overview of civil rights legislation enacted during the Reconstruction, see Douglas
L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 510-12 (1993).
95
See id. at 506 (stating that the Enforcement Act of 1871 “contained in its first section the
language now found” in § 1983).
96
Id. at 513-14.
97
Id. at 510-12.
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often collaborated with racist groups in depriving African-Americans of
The ratification of the Fourteenth
their constitutional rights. 98
Amendment in 1866 led to a wave of violence against freed blacks
throughout the former Confederacy. 99
The Enforcement Act, also called the Ku Klux Klan Act, was based
in part on the earlier 1866 Civil Rights Act. 100 That law, together with
the Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteed African-Americans status as
citizens and empowered the federal government to criminally prosecute
any local official who deprived a citizen of his or her civil rights while
acting “under color of law.” 101 The Enforcement Act granted the
President the power to suspend habeas corpus in prosecuting Klan
members. 102 By 1872, hundreds of Klansmen had been arrested. 103
Ultimately, the federal government broke the organizational apparatus of
the Klan. 104 However, during the Reconstruction period, the civil
provisions of the Enforcement Act, 105 which enabled any plaintiff to file
suit against two or more private individuals who conspired to violate that
person’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, were not utilized by litigants in
redressing civil rights violations. 106
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, later codified as § 1983, empowered
citizens to sue local or state officials for civil rights violations. 107 Its
98

Id. at 514.
Id. at 514-18.
100
Id. at 514 (stating that the drafters of the Enforcement Act modeled its language after the
1866 Civil Rights Act’s criminal provision).
101
See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. § 242 (Westlaw 2011) (prohibiting the deprivation of a person’s civil rights under color of
law); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in
Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 511-12 (1993) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 guaranteed African-Americans the status of citizenship and reinforced the ability of the federal
government to protect the rights of citizenship).
102
See Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 3, 4, 17 Stat. 13, 14-15 (1871) (vesting the
President with discretion to suspend habeas corpus in order to overthrow a rebellion); see also Mark
D. Pezold, When to Be a Court of Last Resort: The Search for a Standard of Review for the
Suspension Clause, 51 B.C. L. REV. 243, 250 (pointing out that after the Civil War, Congress
authorized President Ulysses S. Grant “to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in 1871 as part of the
federal government’s efforts to combat the Ku Klux Klan during the Reconstruction era”).
103
Richard Wormser, The Enforcement Acts (1870-1871), THE RISE AND FALL OF JIM CROW,
JIM CROW STORIES, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_enforce.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2011).
104
Id.
105
The Enforcement (or Ku Klux Klan) Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
106
Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 514-16 (1993).
107
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2011). This statute, which Congress originally enacted as
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, provides as follows:
99

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
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purpose, unlike that of the Enforcement Act, was to protect AfricanAmericans from racist government actors. 108 While citizens could sue
state or municipal governments under the Enforcement Act for violating
federal statutory or constitutional law, the Act did not vest citizens with a
separate cause of action. 109 But other laws existed that protected the civil
rights of African-Americans, including the right to vote (protected by the
Fifteenth Amendment), 110 secure property (protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment), 111 and live as free individuals (protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment). 112 Together with the post-Civil War Amendments, § 1983
deterred local officials from infringing on these rights. 113
B.

THE MODERN USE OF § 1983 AS A MEANS TO BRING EXCESSIVEFORCE CLAIMS AGAINST POLICE DEPARTMENTS

Since the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, the nature of §
1983 litigation has changed. 114 Private individuals still rely on § 1983 as
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
108

Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 515-16 (1993).
109
Id.
110
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
111
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
112
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
113
See Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in
Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 517 (1993) (stating that the purpose of the
Reconstruction-era constitutional amendments was to “counter the officially condoned and
perpetrated white ‘reign of terror’ that sought to reverse the legal gains of African-Americans from
post-War federal policy”).
114
After Reconstruction, courts construed federal civil rights statutes quite narrowly in order
to prevent African-Americans from challenging Jim Crow practices. For example, from 1871 until
1941, Supreme Court decisions on § 1983 limited the meaning of “under color of law” in cases
involving state agents other than law enforcement officials. Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil
Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 518 n.93
(1993). In Barney v. City of New York, the Court held that unauthorized acts of state construction do
not constitute state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Barney v. City of New
York, 193 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1904). Moreover, prior to Monroe v. Pape, the Court’s “under color of
law” had required litigants to establish that the state had authorized an official’s unlawful act under
state law. Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 519 (1993). As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Monroe,
during the “seventy year [sic] which followed [§ 1983’s passage,] . . . the ‘under color’ provisions . .
. uniformly involved action taken either in strict pursuance of some specific command of state law or
within the scope of executive discretion in the administration of state laws.” Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 212-13 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted), overruled on other grounds
by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). This limited
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a powerful tool against police departments that employ racially
discriminatory tactics against suspects. 115 However, today parties can
also use § 1983 to sue the police based on allegations of excessive force,
even in the absence of racial discrimination or racial profiling.116
The Fourth Amendment provides the legal basis for a complaint
alleging excessive force by a police officer. 117 Courts have held that a
police officer’s use of excessive force in detaining or subduing a suspect
constitutes an unlawful “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. 118
Whenever a police officer “accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has seized that person.” 119 The standard for
determining reasonableness takes into account that police officers must
sometimes make split-second decisions when confronting deadly
assailants. 120 Consequently, the “reasonableness” of the seizure depends
not only on when the seizure is made, but also on how it is carried out. 121
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court advanced a more
interpretation of the “under color” language meant that police officers and other officials were not
subject to federal jurisdiction for actions that deprived citizens of their constitutional rights. Douglas
L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 519 n.92 (1993). However, Monroe v. Pape, decided in 1961, “revitalized
Section 1983’s role as a federal civil remedy against individual police officers that deprive citizens
of their constitutional rights.” Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants:
Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 519 (1993). In Monroe, the
Supreme Court rejected the narrow definition of the term “under color of law” that had stymied §
1983 litigation for the preceding ninety years. Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights
Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 519 n.92 (1993).
Monroe held that plaintiffs could use § 1983 to remedy a constitutional injury inflicted by a police
officer whose misuse of power by “virtue of state law [was only] made possible . . . because the
wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law.” Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
115
Racial profiling claims are usually based on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction . . . .”). But § 1983 serves as a vehicle for bringing
these and other constitutional claims. See generally Jeremiah Wagner, Racial (De)Profiling:
Modeling a Remedy for Racial Profiling After the School Desegregation Cases, 22 LAW & INEQ. 73,
82 (2004) (discussing the role of the Equal Protection Clause in racial profiling cases).
116
See Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in
Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 753-57 (1993) (discussing the ways in which §
1983 has been used to litigate against police departments).
117
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (holding that “apprehension by the use of
deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment”).
118
See id. 7-8 (holding that a seizure is unlawful when it is unreasonable in light of the
amount of force used in the course of the intrusion and the interest at stake).
119
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (internal citation omitted).
120
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (holding that “[t]he calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation”).
121
Garner, 471 U.S. at 8.
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specific standard for determining when an officer’s use of deadly force is
objectively reasonable. 122 While an officer is allowed to arrest a person
if “he has probable cause to believe that person committed a crime,” the
use of deadly force is permissible only when the suspect poses a threat of
deadly force to others or the officer herself. 123 An officer’s belief that a
suspect is trying to use deadly force must be reasonable. 124 In making
that determination, courts will balance the “totality of circumstances”
that existed at the time of the seizure. 125 For instance, in Gray-Hopkins
v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, the Fourth Circuit held that the
fatal shooting of an unarmed suspect who was standing still with his
hands over his head was excessive and unconstitutional because the man
did not pose any threat to public safety. 126
The test is an objective one; the officer’s motives do not factor into
a § 1983 analysis concerning the lawfulness of a police seizure. 127
Instead, courts consider only circumstances of which the officer had
knowledge at the time of the shooting, not after the fact. 128 More
specifically, when suicide by cop is in play, the issue becomes whether
the police were aware of the suspect’s suicidal motives at the time of the
shooting. If the officer was not aware of the suspect’s suicidal motives at
the time of the shooting, then those motives do not factor into a § 1983
analysis because Graham proscribes the use of hindsight in determining
whether a police shooting was reasonable. 129
C.

SUICIDE BY COP IN § 1983 LITIGATION AND WHETHER A SUSPECT’S
SUICIDAL MOTIVES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN A TOTALITY-OFTHE-CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS
The seminal case on suicide by cop is Palmquist v. Selvik. 130
122

Id. at 17-22.
See id. at 2 (holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is not permissible unless
the officer “has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or
serious physical harm to the officer or others”).
124
See id. (holding that “apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement”).
125
Id. at 9-10.
126
Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, 309 F.3d 224, 231 (4th Cir. 2002).
127
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-98 (1989) (holding that the question is whether
the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable “in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation”).
128
See id. at 396 (holding that the reasonableness “of a particular use of force must be judged
from the perspective of the reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight”).
129
Id.
130
Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J.
123
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Palmquist addressed the question whether evidence that the suspect was
attempting suicide by cop is admissible in a § 1983 suit. 131 While the
Seventh Circuit declined to admit evidence of the suspect’s suicidal
motives on the facts of that case, in dictum it stressed that evidence of
suicide by cop can be admissible at trial by either party under certain
circumstances. 132 The court applied the Graham standard in determining
the lawfulness of a police shooting in a suicide-by-cop scenario;
however, the decision demonstrates that evidence of a suspect’s suicidal
intentions can both strengthen and undermine the merits of a § 1983
claim. 133
In Palmquist, Paul Palmquist, a resident of Bensenville, Illinois,
began screaming obscenities and incoherent statements in his apartment
and broke his neighbor’s window. 134 The police were notified of his
erratic behavior, and when officers arrived at his apartment they found
Palmquist wielding a muffler pipe. 135 Suffering from hallucinations, he
thought that the police officers were there to kill him. 136 When the
officers attempted to arrest him for breaking the windows, he swung the
pipe at one of the officers and landed a blow. 137 After Palmquist swung
the pipe again, another officer fired numerous shots, killing him. 138
Palmquist’s last words were, “You finally gave me what I wanted,” and
“I hope this worked, I hope you shot me enough.” 139
Palmquist was a Vietnam War veteran who had told friends that he
wished to be shot by the police because he was depressed with his job as
a mechanic and the fact that he did not have a girlfriend. 140 At the time
of the incident with the police, he may have been under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, and shouted at the officers that they were Viet Cong
colonels. 141 After his death, Palmquist’s estate filed suit against the city,
alleging a § 1983 violation for use of excessive force. 142 The estate
argued that Selvik, the sheriff who fatally shot Palmquist eleven times,
Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits: Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 555, 559, 563 (2000) (characterizing Palmquist as the first case on suicide by cop).
131
Palmquist, 111 F.3d at 1340-42.
132
Id. at 1338-42.
133
See id. at 1337.
134
Id. at 1335.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 1336.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 1338.
141
Id. at 1336, 1338.
142
Id. at 1336.
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and the other officers had received inadequate training on how to handle
persons behaving abnormally and used excessive force in seizing
Palmquist. 143 Although the estate did not rely on Palmquist’s suicidal
motives to support its legal argument, several references were made
during trial regarding Palmquist’s desire to commit suicide. 144 However,
the magistrate judge crafted a jury instruction stating that any evidence
of the suspect’s “death wish” was irrelevant to the excessive-force claim,
since it fell outside the time frame of the shooting (evidence that
Palmquist wished to kill himself emerged only after Palmquist was
shot). 145 The jury found the city liable and awarded the estate $165,000
in damages. 146
Selvik and the city appealed the verdict, arguing that the judge had
improperly excluded evidence concerning Palmquist’s death wish,
because this evidence was directly relevant to both liability and
damages. 147 The city argued that evidence of Palmquist’s intent to
commit suicide by cop was relevant to liability, because it tended to
show that Palmquist was the initial aggressor during his entanglement
with police officers and that the officers’ lethal response was therefore
appropriate. 148 The city also argued that evidence of suicide by cop was
admissible under Rule 404(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as an
exception to the general prohibition against character evidence in
criminal cases, for the purpose of showing that Palmquist was the “first
aggressor.” 149 The defense sought to show that the officer who shot
Palmquist acted in self-defense, and that Palmquist was the proximate
cause of his own death. 150 As to the question of damages, the city argued
that if Palmquist was suicidal, any computation of damages based on his
life expectancy prior to the shooting should have taken his suicidal
motives into account. 151
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the award with regard to the

143

Id.
Id. at 1341.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 1342.
147
Id. at 1337.
148
Id. at 1338.
149
Id. at 1332, 1338; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (prohibiting the admission of evidence
of a person’s character or a trait of character for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except where “[i]n a criminal case . . . the prosecution [offers]
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim . . . [in order] to rebut evidence that
the alleged victim was the first aggressor”).
150
Palmquist, 111 F.3d at 1339.
151
Id. at 1342.
144
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excessive-force claim and the police department’s liability. 152 It also
affirmed the inadmissibility of evidence pertaining to Palmquist’s
suicidal motives with regard to the excessive-force claim. 153 The court
held that evidence of Palmquist’s death wish was inadmissible under the
character-evidence rule. 154 Moreover, it did not tend to make the
existence of any fact material to “the objective reasonableness” test more
or less probable, as this evidence came to light only after the shooting. 155
For these reasons, the court declined to upset the jury’s verdict. 156
However, the panel noted that the trial court had admitted much
evidence bearing on Palmquist’s suicidal desires. 157 Experts on both
sides characterized the case as a suicide-by-cop situation, and the jury
heard them characterize it as such. 158 The appellate court held that the
admission of additional evidence about suicide by cop would have been
“cumulative” and “prejudicial.” 159 Furthermore, even assuming that the
additional evidence was improperly excluded, the error was harmless and
therefore not a basis for overturning the verdict. 160
However, the court also declared that the suspect’s death wish was
relevant to determining the validity of the damages award. 161 The court
held that completely excluding evidence bearing on Palmquist’s suicidal
motives “could have had a highly prejudicial impact on the jury’s
ultimate award to the plaintiff.” 162 Palmquist’s suicidal statements to
friends before the shooting reflected his life expectancy and were
therefore relevant in calculating damages. 163 However, because Selvik’s
counsel did not fully present this argument on appeal, it was forfeited,
and the appellate court could not rule on the matter. 164 While the court
strongly admonished Selvik’s attorneys for not exercising due diligence
and raising this point at trial, it affirmed the trial court’s award of
damages. 165
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion suggests that either side
152

Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1340-41.
154
Id. at 1341.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 1347.
157
Id. at 1341.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 1342.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
153
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may introduce testimony about suicide by cop, if 1) it proves relevant to
the question of damages, 2) the police were aware that the suspect was
attempting suicide by goading officers into killing him or her, and 3)
there is a dispute regarding the facts and the suspect’s suicidal motives
have probative value in resolving that dispute. 166 In Palmquist, the court
cited another Seventh Circuit case, Sherrod v. Berry, which held that
“knowledge of facts and circumstances gained after the fact . . . has no
place in the . . . jury’s post-hoc analysis of the reasonableness of the
actor’s judgment. Were the rule otherwise, . . . the jury would possess
more information than the officer possessed when he made the crucial
decision.” 167 The Palmquist court reiterated this rule by concluding that
information that Sergeant Selvik did not possess at the time of the
shooting, “such as Palmquist’s mental state and his physical behavior
before the encounter,” was inadmissible. 168 Such information would
divert the jury’s focus from Palmquist’s actions to facts not immediately
accessible to Selvik during his confrontation with the suspect—like
Palmquist’s mental condition. 169
However, the court qualified its general restriction on testimony
concerning suicide by cop: such testimony is inadmissible only if it
“occurred outside the presence of the police” and they “had no personal
knowledge of it.” 170 This qualification suggests that if police officers are
aware of the suspect’s suicidal motives prior to the shooting, their
awareness may be probative in determining whether the officers used
excessive force. The court stated that Officer Selvik “knew nothing of
[Palmquist’s] preexisting condition and behavior” when he first
encountered him. 171 Consequently, these facts “could not have entered
into Selvik’s determination on whether or not to shoot or how many
times.” 172 The court’s reasoning indicates that an officer’s personal
knowledge can be probative when it goes to the issue of objective
reasonableness. In light of the officer’s knowledge at the time of the
shooting, the court may consider whether his or her use of lethal force
against a suspect who merely intended to commit suicide was objectively
reasonable. The officer’s personal knowledge is something a jury may
take into account when assessing the reasonableness of a police response.
For instance, the jury heard Palmquist’s statement to Selvik that the
166

Id. at 1341-42.
Id. at 1339 (quoting Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1988)).
168
Palmquist, 111 F.3d at 1340.
169
Id. at 1340-41.
170
Id. at 1340.
171
Id. at 1341.
172
Id.
167
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police would have to kill him, and also Palmquist’s last words that “this
is what [he] wanted [the police] to do.” 173 Thus, the jury’s determination
that Selvik’s eleven gunshots amounted to excessive force may have
been based in part on the jury’s consideration of these statements, despite
the judge’s limiting instructions. 174
Other decisions also suggest that evidence of a suspect’s desire to
commit suicide is admissible, as long as this evidence was known to the
officer at the time of the shooting. In Rascon v. Hardimen, another
Seventh Circuit decision, officers severely beat a mentally impaired
suspect. 175 The trial judge refused to admit evidence of the suspect’s
mental history, and on appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling.176
The court held that the admission of such evidence might lead a jury to
conclude that the suspect invited mistreatment at the hands of police
officers. 177 The jury could draw such a conclusion only on the basis of
facts available at the time of the altercation. 178 However, had the officer
known of the suspect’s mental state before the severe beating, under
Palmquist such knowledge might have been admissible as evidence in
proving that the officer’s use of force was reasonable.
Ironically, evidence that the suspect was attempting suicide may
undermine a § 1983 claim if it appears that the suspect was inciting a
lethal response through provocative or dangerous actions. In a Ninth
Circuit case, Boyd v. City and County of San Francisco, a kidnapping
suspect, Cammerin Boyd, repeatedly screamed at police officers to kill
him. 179 The officers asked Boyd to lie on the ground, and when he
reached into his vehicle instead, the officers shot and killed him. 180
Boyd’s estate filed a § 1983 lawsuit against the county, and the county
sought to introduce expert testimony that Boyd was attempting suicide
by cop. 181 The court held that such testimony was relevant to whether
Boyd engaged in provocative actions against the police, and that “the
suicide-by-cop theory” was “generally accepted in the relevant
professional community” and therefore reliable. 182 Consequently, it
173

Id.
See id. (suggesting that the jury possibly considered the suspect’s suicidal intentions).
175
Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1986).
176
Id. at 278.
177
Id.
178
See id. (holding that the exclusion of testimony regarding the suspect’s mental history was
proper because such testimony might improperly suggest that “it would be reasonable to subdue him
based on a supposed status rather than his conduct at the time [of the shooting]”).
179
Boyd v. City & County of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 2009).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 945-46.
182
Under the federal rules of evidence, in order for an expert’s testimony to be admissible at
174
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upheld the district court’s decision to allow the county to introduce
expert testimony on suicide by cop. 183
Boyd demonstrates that evidence of suicide by cop can be a doubleedged sword. In some cases, it may be detrimental to a plaintiff’s
excessive-force claim. Often, a mentally ill suspect poses a threat to
others even while attempting suicide. The use of lethal force against
such a suspect may be justified. For instance, the suspect in Palmquist
yelled at the officers trying to apprehend him that they were Viet Cong
colonels. 184 One could argue that he was suffering from hallucinations
that made him dangerous to the police. The lesson of Palmquist and the
aforementioned cases is that evidence pertaining to a suspect’s suicidal
motives may be relevant and admissible in a § 1983 lawsuit, and the jury
may consider such evidence in deciding whether to impose liability on a
police department. If the evidence shows that the suspect posed a threat
of harm only to himself or herself, the suspect’s death is likely to elicit
sympathy from the jury, thereby allowing the plaintiff to prevail at trial.
Other federal circuits have also prohibited the admission of preseizure evidence in § 1983 suits. For instance, in Dickerson v.
McClellan, a Sixth Circuit case, police entered Joel Dickerson’s home
without first knocking and announcing their presence. 185 They heard
Dickerson screaming the words, “I’ll get you motherfucker” 186 but they
did not know whom Dickerson was speaking to. One of the officers saw
a gun in Dickerson’s hand, and the officer fired four shots. 187 Dickerson
was killed, and his estate sued the police department for excessive
force. 188 An investigation revealed that Dickerson’s revolver was not
cocked, and that he had not shot at any of the police officers. 189 In fact,
he had been on the phone with his girlfriend, and his threatening
statement was directed at her. 190
The court limited its inquiry to circumstances of which the officer
trial it must meet be based on reliable principles and methods that are applicable to the facts of the
case. Id. at 945 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)).
183
Boyd, 576 F.3d at 946.
184
Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1336 (7th Cir. 1997).
185
Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 1996). The knock-andannounce rule is a common-law requirement that police officers seeking to enter a residential home
must first knock on the door, announce their presence, and then wait a reasonable period before
forcibly entering. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934-36 (1995). Only exigent circumstances
can justify an officer’s forced entry into a private home without first knocking and announcing his or
her presence. Id.
186
Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1154.
187
Id. at 1155.
188
Id. at 1154.
189
Id. at 1155.
190
Id.
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had knowledge at the time of the shooting. 191 It “segmented” or
distinguished the violation of the knock-and-announce rule (requiring
police officers to announce their presence before entering someone’s
home) from the excessive-force claim. 192 Accordingly, in determining
the validity of the plaintiff’s excessive-force claim, the court declined to
consider the reasonableness of the officer’s actions prior to his “seizure”
of the suspect. 193 Even if an officer is responsible for creating the
circumstances that necessitated the use of lethal force, a court should not
consider the officer’s actions prior to his or her use of force. 194 The
prohibition against considering pre-seizure evidence applies to both the
officer’s and the suspect’s conduct. For example, a suicide note would
constitute pre-seizure evidence of the suspect’s suicidal motives, and
under Dickerson it may not be admissible—that is, of course, unless the
officer read it prior to shooting the suspect. If the officer reads the note
before shooting the suspect, he or she would have knowledge of the
suspect’s suicidal desire within the appropriate time frame, and evidence
of that desire may then become admissible in determining whether the
officer’s actions were reasonable.
The Tenth Circuit has likewise held that a court should consider an
officer’s conduct prior to the suspect’s threat of force only if the conduct
is “immediately connected” to the threat. 195 A suspect’s statement that
he or she wishes to commit suicide may be the basis for finding that
immediate connection, depending on when the officer hears the
statement—if the officer hears the statement before he or she shoots the
suspect, the statement may be admissible. The Fourth Circuit has also
adopted a narrow scope of the shooting time-frame, holding that
questions like whether an officer showed his badge to a suspect or
demanded that the suspect stop his car are irrelevant, because what
matters is whether the officer had “reason to believe that [the suspect]
posed a threat of death or serious bodily harm to him” at the moment of
the shooting. 196
Other circuits have similarly restricted the admissibility of evidence
191

Id. at 1162-63.
Id. at 1160-63.
193
Id. at 1160-62.
194
See id. at 1161 (stating that in deciding a § 1983 case, a court must examine “whether the
force used to effect that seizure was reasonable in the totality of the circumstances, not whether it
was reasonable for the police to create the circumstances”) (quoting Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d
1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992)).
195
Allen v. Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1997).
196
See Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that an officer’s failure to
show his badge after stopping a suspect does not mean that the officer’s subsequent use of force was
unconstitutional).
192
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in excessive-force cases. In Wood v. City of Lakeland, an Eleventh
Circuit case, officers entered the room of a “volatile, emotional and
aggressive” teenager who was threatening to commit suicide. 197 The
teenager had not committed a crime. 198 However, when officers entered
the premises, they found the teenager bleeding on his dresser and holding
a knife. 199 When the teenager slid off the dresser, the officers shot
him. 200 The defense argued that the suspect had come at the officers
with a knife. 201 By contrast, the plaintiff argued that the teenager was
lying prone on the floor when he was shot. 202 Despite the factual
dispute, the court sided with the defendants and concluded that knifewielding suspect could have endangered the officers, due to his
aggravated emotional state and possession of a dangerous weapon. 203
The court declined to consider the suspect’s suicidal impulses of which
the officers were aware, and whether in light of those impulses the police
should have acted with greater restraint.
Other courts have refused to hold the police liable for the death of a
suicidal suspect. For instance, in Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, the
Tenth Circuit ruled against a suspect who sued under New Mexico state
tort law and § 1983. 204 The suspect, Berlinda Griego, held a gun to her
head after she was pulled over by police officers and asked the officers to
leave her alone so that she could kill herself. 205 She refused several
commands to drop her gun. 206 After being blockaded by police cars,
Griego turned her gun on the officers, who immediately shot and killed
her. 207 While the trial court ruled in favor of Griego’s estate on its §
1983 claim, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court had
applied the wrong standard of reasonableness. 208 The police officers
may have negligently placed themselves in harm’s way when they
approached the suspect after she asked to be left alone, but their actions

197

Wood v. City of Lakeland, 203 F.3d 1288, 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on
other grounds in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
198
The suspect’s family called the police because he was trying to injure himself. Id. at 1290.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 1290-91.
201
Id. at 1290.
202
Id. at 1290-91.
203
Id. at 1293.
204
Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1991), overruled on other
grounds by Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987).
205
Id. at 712.
206
Id. at 713.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 716-17.
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did not give rise to a colorable excessive-force claim under Graham. 209
Quezada illustrates two points: that a suspect’s suicidal motives may not
provide significant evidentiary support for a plaintiff’s arguments, and
that a finding of negligence under state tort law does not by itself support
a § 1983 claim.
Another decision, Plakas v. Drinski, reinforces the difficulty of
raising suicide by cop as a theory for recovery under § 1983. 210 In
Plakas, the Seventh Circuit held that police officers have no
constitutional duty to employ nonlethal means in subduing a dangerous
suspect, even if the suspect is attempting suicide-by-cop. 211 The court
stressed the importance of evaluating objective signs that the suspect
poses a danger to police officers, rather than evaluating the suspect’s
subjective intent. 212 For example, if a suspect points a gun at a police
officer, a lethal response by the officer would be appropriate even if
evidence later shows that the suspect did not intend to kill the officer. 213
Thus, while courts following Palmquist may accept evidence of a
suspect’s suicidal desires in determining whether a police response was
unreasonable or excessive, courts outside the Seventh Circuit seem
reticent in considering such evidence. The Tenth, Eleventh, and Seventh
Circuits have indicated that even if the suspect is suicidal, as long as he
or she possesses a weapon and makes provocative gestures, the police are
entitled to use lethal force. Nevertheless, the Palmquist verdict suggests
that, despite the more academic holding of the appellate opinion, the jury
took the victim’s statements—that he wanted the police to shoot him—
into consideration when deciding whether to hold the police liable.
Because other circuits may decide to follow Palmquist, police

209

Id. The Tenth Circuit stressed that the standard of reasonableness in negligence cases is
broader than the reasonableness standard applied under § 1983 and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989). Under an ordinary negligence standard, the trier of fact may consider whether officers acted
unreasonably before engaging the suspect. However, the reasonableness inquiry under § 1983 is far
more time-specific: only the circumstances immediately preceding the shooting can be assessed in
determining whether officers violated a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. In Quezada, although
the court did not find that the police officer had violated Griego’s constitutional rights, it found that
he had breached the duty of care he owed to Griego. Id. at 722. He breached this duty because he
“amplified the risk of harm to Ms. Griego” when he approached her vehicle. Accordingly, the court
found that he had acted negligently but not with excessive force. Id.
210
Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. 1994).
211
Id.
212
The court declared that “[s]hooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to
use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of
self-defense even if, as Plakas’s expert maintains, the man is attempting ‘suicide by police.’” Id. at
1146.
213
The court rejected the proposition that it should “return to the prior segments of the event
and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct.” Id. at 1150.
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departments should consider the liability they may face if they fail to
train officers in properly identifying and engaging with suspects who
may be attempting suicide by cop.
IV. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ADDRESSING SUICIDE BY COP AS A
SERIOUS PROBLEM WITHIN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY
A blanket refusal to scrutinize police tactics in suicide-by-cop
incidents may “invite reckless and irresponsible police behavior.” 214 On
the one hand, holding an officer liable for shooting a suspect with a gun
may impair the ability of police departments to protect the public. On
the other hand, police departments cannot ignore the possibility that
some suspects commit provocative acts for the purpose of inviting a
lethal response. Devising a way to reduce suicide-by-cop incidents
without hindering police responsiveness proves difficult, especially when
only 22% of suicide-by-cop attempts involve an empty gun or some
other nonlethal prop. 215 Most other attempts involve lethal force directed
at the officer. 216
Moreover, requiring a police officer to assess the psychological
condition of a suspect, in addition to any number of other split-second
judgments the officer is required to make under life-threatening
circumstances might not be fair. Requiring officers to use more lenient
tactics in subduing suicidal suspects might encourage non-suicidal
suspects to feign suicide in order to accomplish their criminal ends. In
light of the relationship between homicidal and suicidal tendencies, these
“criminal ends” often involve the intent to kill or harm others; 217 the
Columbine shooters exemplify this trend. 218 Preserving the life of an
individual who attempts suicide becomes less of a priority if he or she
poses a threat to innocent civilians.
Nevertheless, police departments should do all they can to restrain
officers in the use of lethal force. Few would criticize the police officer
in Plakas for subduing a suspect who came at the officer with a sharp
metal object by shooting him, because that suspect posed a danger to the

214

Timothy P. Flynn & Robert J. Homant, “Suicide by Police” in Section 1983 Suits:
Relevance of Police Tactics, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555, 577 (2000).
215
Id. at 578.
216
Id.
217
MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 13 (2004).
218
James Garbarino, Lost Boys: Pathways from Childhood Aggression and Sadness to Youth
Violence, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 131 (2000).
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officer. 219 However, a suspect like the one in Wood – the teenager who
was attempting suicide – may elicit more sympathy from a jury. 220 The
officer in Wood could have subdued the suspect with a taser, as the
suspect had not yet charged at the police officers. 221 In fact, he fell to the
floor before he was shot. 222 Had the officers understood the nature of the
suspect’s acts and that he only intended to harm himself, tragedy might
have been averted. Consequently, police departments should take
reasonable steps to prevent suicide by cop. In order to improve their
tactical response to suicide by cop, law enforcement agencies should take
the following steps: 1) implement a procedure for tracking the frequency
of suicide-by-cop incidents, and 2) better educate officers on to use
nonlethal methods to resolve suicide-by-cop attempts.
A.

IMPLEMENTING A UNIFORM METHOD FOR REPORTING SUICIDE BY
COP

The absence of national statistics on suicide by cop hinders law
enforcement agencies in fully addressing the problem.
Without
comprehensive studies, police departments cannot incorporate a
procedure to address suicide by cop into their tactical training programs.
One proposed solution is to collect several hundred incidents from
around the country and determine the common characteristics that
victims involved in these incidents share, so as to convey a “sense of the
With this information, law
‘typical’ suicide-by-cop incident.” 223
enforcement officers would be better equipped to recognize and
formulate appropriate responses to suicide-by-cop incidents.
A study by the FBI, published in 2005, advocates the use of a twotiered system in evaluating attempts at suicide by cop. 224 First, after the
event occurs, the officer present at the scene makes the initial
219

In Plakas, the suspect assailed the police officer with a fireplace poker. Plakas v. Drinski,
19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1994).
220
In Wood, the suspect had cut himself repeatedly with a knife before the police arrived,
indicating that he likely meant to harm only himself. Wood v. City of Lakeland, 203 F.3d 1288,
1290 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). The
autopsy report also indicated that the suspect had not raised his hand in a threatening gesture toward
the cops. Id. at 1290-91. The officers shot him when he slid off the dresser on which he was sitting.
Id. at 1293.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 109 (2004).
224
Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, & Charles E. Miller, Suicide by Cop: Defining a
Devastating Dilemma, 74 THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 2, 10 (2005), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2005-pdfs/feb05leb.pdf.
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determination that the suspect’s use of deadly force was motivated by
suicide. 225 Second, an officer with expertise in handling deadly-force
incidents makes a final determination after a complete investigation as to
whether the initial officer’s determination was correct. 226 Circumstances
that will support these determinations include “statements made by the
offender . . . ; [the] type of weapon possessed by the offender; . . .
conduct that the officer deemed bizarre or inappropriate on the part of the
offender; and circumstances indicating that the offender’s motivation
may have been suicide.” 227 Obviously, in some cases the offender’s
motivation may not be apparent even after a full investigation.
Nevertheless, this approach will enable law enforcement agencies to
measure the frequency of suicide by cop more effectively.
B.

HOW OFFICERS CAN SUBDUE ATTEMPTS AT SUICIDE BY COP
WITHOUT RESORTING TO DEADLY FORCE

There are a number of nonlethal methods for restraining a suicidal
suspect. One such method is “tactical withdrawal”: once an officer
determines that an individual is suicidal, the officer can create greater
physical distance between him or herself and the individual. 228 Physical
distance will mitigate the threat posed to police officers and give officers
more time to formulate a plan of action to calm and neutralize the
suicidal individual. 229 Some commentators suggest that a suicidal
individual can be left alone as long as it is “in an area . . . where no one
else is at risk.” 230 Through withdrawal, police officers can at least make
it difficult for the suspect to commit suicide.
The police can also deal with suspects wielding weapons other than
firearms or bombs by using nonlethal force. 231 A knife-wielding suspect,
like the suspect in Wood, can sometimes be disarmed using shotgunprojected bean bags or rubber bullets. 232 A sharpshooter can keep a
target on the perpetrator, in case he or she runs at an officer with a
dangerous object. 233 Likewise, a taser can be employed against a

225

Id.
Id.
227
Id.
228
MARK LINDSAY & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE BY COP: COMMITTING SUICIDE BY
PROVOKING POLICE TO SHOOT YOU 9, 110 (2004).
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
226
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suspect who is not holding a firearm. 234
Police departments should instruct officers to employ these
nonlethal methods only when they can reasonably ascertain that a suspect
poses no risk of deadly harm to others. Once they receive rigorous
training on the characteristics that suicidal suspects share, police officers
can more readily recognize a genuine attempt at suicide by cop and
handle the situation accordingly. This sort of training will enhance the
quality of police work and aid social workers and psychologists in
treating suicidal and emotionally disturbed individuals before they meet
a tragic end.
CONCLUSION
The lack of comprehensive legal literature on suicide by cop
perpetuates the belief that nothing can be done by law enforcement
agencies to ameliorate this primarily sociological problem. Perhaps the
scarcity of such literature reflects a belief that unless something poses a
tangible threat of litigation, it need not be addressed as a serious concern.
However, suicide-by-cop incidents often lead to lawsuits. Moreover,
evidence of a suspect’s suicidal desires may negate the reasonableness of
a lethal police response under § 1983, thereby empowering plaintiffs in
Fourth Amendment suits.
Strong policy reasons exist for distinguishing police-assisted suicide
from assault or homicide incidents. Law enforcement agencies should
recall the original impetus behind the enactment of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act: protecting African-Americans from abuse and discrimination at the
hands of the state. As discussed earlier, those who commit suicide by
cop tend to be destitute and to suffer from substance abuse or mental
illness. Suicide by cop is a byproduct of cumulative factors prevalent in
lower-income communities. When the police kill individuals desperate
enough to attempt suicide, they remain apathetic to discriminatory state
policies that exacerbate such factors.
Police tactics take on a
discriminatory hue, thereby undermining the very spirit of § 1983. Thus,
police officers should do their best to defuse suicide-by-cop incidents
through nonlethal force. If police departments can adopt this approach,
they would set a powerful example for the rest of society to follow in
redressing the ills that § 1983 was designed to combat.

234

Id. at 111.
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